Threshold uncertainty, early warning signals, and the prevention of dangerous climate change

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Abstract

The goal of the Paris Agreement is to keep global temperature rise well below 2°C. In this agreement—and its antecedents negotiated in Copenhagen and Cancun—the fear of crossing a dangerous climate threshold is supposed to serve as the catalyst for cooperation amongst countries. However, there are deep uncertainties about the location of the threshold for dangerous climate change, and recent evidence indicates this threshold uncertainty is a major impediment to collective action. Early warning signals of approaching climate thresholds are a potential remedy to this threshold uncertainty problem, and initial experimental evidence suggests such early detection systems may improve the prospects of cooperation. Here, we provide a direct experimental assessment of this early warning signal hypothesis. Using a catastrophe avoidance game, we show that large initial—and subsequently

unreduced—threshold uncertainty undermines cooperation, consistent with earlier studies. An early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 10% (but not 30%) of the threshold value catalysed cooperation and reduced the probability of catastrophe occurring, albeit not reliably so. Our findings suggest early warning signals can trigger action to avoid a dangerous threshold, but additional mechanisms may be required to foster the cooperation needed to ensure the threshold is not breached.

Keywords: cooperation, dangerous climate change, early warning signals, threshold uncertainty

Introduction

The goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to achieve "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC, 1992). But what constitutes dangerous interference? In 2009, the signatories of the Copenhagen Accord reached an agreed definition, namely that in accordance with "the scientific view the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius" (UNFCCC, 2009). It is the fear of crossing this dangerous threshold that provides the free-rider deterrent in the contemporary climate agreements. The effectiveness of this deterrent depends upon its credibility, specifically, the credibility of the science of locating the critical threshold (Barrett, 2014).

However, there is no scientific view that 2°C is the threshold for dangerous anthropogenic interference. Although there is a consensus regarding the existence of dangerous climate thresholds, the location of those thresholds is highly uncertain and the subject of considerable scientific debate (Kriegler et al, 2009; Lenton et al, 2008; Rockström et al, 2009). For example, based on the goal of preserving the large polar ice sheets, Rockström et al (2009) identify a "planetary boundary" of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration of somewhere between 350 and 550 parts per million by volume (a boundary which has already been exceeded). However, the location of the critical threshold within this boundary that could trigger the abrupt collapse of the ice sheets is unknown.

Political actors and climate negotiators are not oblivious to this scientific uncertainty. No sooner had the signatories of the Copenhagen Accord agreed upon the 2-degree-target than a year later in Cancun, discussions were raised regarding the possibility of adopting a 1.5°C target. This uncertainty is enshrined in the Paris Agreement, which—in addition to reaffirming the 2-degree-target—underscores the desirability of "pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C" (UNFCCC, 2015).

Threshold uncertainty and collective action

What are the consequences for the climate negotiations of uncertainty about climate thresholds? Recently, an experimental literature has emerged to tackle this question. Within this literature, the problem of avoiding dangerous climate change has been simulated using laboratory cooperation experiments (for a review, see Hurlstone et al, 2017). In these experiments, groups of players must cooperate by investing money from a personal operating fund into hypothetical emission abatement to avoid crossing a dangerous threshold, which, if breached, triggers catastrophic economic losses for all. This literature finds that when the threshold is known with certainty, groups can effectively coordinate their efforts to remain on the safe side of the dangerous threshold, but when the threshold is uncertain, coordination collapses, and catastrophe is all but guaranteed (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012, 2014a; Brown and Kroll, 2017; Dannenberg et al, 2015). Although threshold uncertainty impedes cooperation compared to when the threshold is known with certainty, it nevertheless facilitates cooperation compared to when there is no threshold at all (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2014b). This suggests the framing of the climate negotiations in terms of avoiding "dangerous" instead of "gradual" climate change has been beneficial (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2014b)—faced with an uncertain threshold, countries may reduce their emissions more than if they were unaware of a threshold for dangerous climate change. However, it may not be enough to prevent countries from crossing the dangerous threshold.

An additional feature of these and other threshold experiments is that under threshold certainty, there is a strong relationship between what groups propose to do, pledge to contribute, and actually contribute, whereas under threshold uncertainty, pledges are less than proposals, and contributions are less than pledges (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012, 2014a,b, 2016; Dannenberg et al, 2015). The parallels with the real climate negotiations are striking and sobering. Under the Paris Agreement, countries have proposed to do less than is required to limit the risk of catastrophe (the agreement aims to restrict warming to 2°C but recognises that a 1.5°C goal is probably required) and pledged to contribute less than is required to reach the collective goal (Robiou du Pont et al, 2017; Rogelj et al, 2016; UNFCCC, 2015). Laboratory cooperation experiments suggest countries' actual contributions will be less than their pledges, leaving little hope of staying below the 2°C limit (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2016).

A clear implication of the results of threshold experiments is that if climate scientists could reduce the uncertainty surrounding the location of the dangerous threshold sufficiently, then this might provide the leverage necessary to transform the climate negotiations. Uncertainty about the location of a dangerous threshold can be reduced through the detection of early warning signals of approaching climate transitions (Lenton, 2011; Lenton et al, 2012; Lenton, 2013; Scheffer et al, 2009, 2012). For example, strong positive feedback in the internal dynamics of the climate system or generic statistical indicators of loss

of system resilience could provide indications that a climate tipping point is approaching (Lenton, 2013).

That such early warning signals might facilitate cooperation was demonstrated in an experiment by Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) that parametrically varied the degree of uncertainty surrounding the threshold. In their experiment, participants were randomly allocated to groups of ten players. Each player was given €31, which was divided into an operating fund of €11 and an endowment of €20. The operating fund could be used to invest in "weak" or "strong" abatement by purchasing poker chips (max = 10 of each type) at a cost of €0.10 or €1.00, respectively. The game was played over a single round divided into two stages: a communication stage, where each player submitted a proposal regarding the contribution target for the group and pledged an amount they would contribute individually (both proposals and pledges were non-binding), followed by a contribution stage where each player chose how many poker chips they would actually contribute. Players received €0.05 for each poker chip contributed by the group, regardless of its cost. Critically, if the total number of poker chips contributed by the group was less than a threshold value, then €15 was deducted from each player's endowment, which represented the impact (i.e., damages) of failing to reach the threshold.

The experiment comprised five treatments, each containing 10 groups. In the certainty treatment, the threshold was 150, whereas in four threshold-uncertainty treatments, it was a uniformly distributed random variable between either 100–200 (100% uncertainty), 135–165 (30% uncertainty), 140–160 (20% uncertainty), or 145–155 (10% uncertainty).

The results revealed the sensitivity of collective action to the degree of uncertainty about the tipping point. When the threshold was certain, 80% of groups avoided catastrophe, whereas this value plummeted to 0% in treatments 100–200, 135–165, and 140–160, where the degree of threshold uncertainty varied between 100% to 30%. However, in treatment 145–155, where threshold uncertainty was reduced to within 10% of the threshold value, 40% of groups avoided catastrophe.

Current research

The results of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) suggest early warning signals that reduce uncertainty about the proximity of a dangerous climate threshold might catalyse action to avoid it, provided that uncertainty is reduced to within a very narrow range. However, there are two potential limitations of this study. First, it employed a one-shot game which fails to capture the repeated nature of the real game of climate change in which countries interact continuously and one country's decision about how much to abate is informed by how much other countries have pledged to abate, how much they have actually abated, and the consistency between stated intentions and behaviour. However, in the one-shot game, beliefs about how much others will abate can only be informed by others' pledges, not actual abatements. Second, groups in the uncertainty treatments

were always confronted with the same level of threshold uncertainty (threshold uncertainty varied between but not within treatments). However, in the real climate game, an early warning signal would arrive against the backdrop of initial threshold uncertainty. Thus, a more realistic assessment of the early warning signal hypothesis requires an experimental scenario wherein groups face threshold uncertainty initially, followed by a reduction in that uncertainty as the threshold is approached. Under this scenario, we might expect an early warning signal to be less effective at catalysing cooperation. For example, the relatively large threshold uncertainty faced by groups initially might cause cooperation to collapse to a point from which recovery is difficult, given the remaining time available.

Here, we present the results of an experiment designed to address these important issues. Our experiment involved 240 participants who were allocated to six-player groups to play a catastrophe avoidance game developed by (Milinski et al, 2008) and subsequently augmented by Dannenberg et al (2015) to include a communication component and study threshold uncertainty effects. Each player was given a $40 endowment. In each of ten rounds, players decided whether to contribute $0, $2, or $4 into a catastrophe avoidance account. Players knew if the total amount contributed by the end of the game did not equal or exceed a threshold amount, they would lose 90% of their remaining endowment. Before the contribution decisions on rounds 1 and 6, each player submitted two non-binding communications: (1) a proposal regarding how much the group should collectively contribute over the 10 rounds and (2) a pledge regarding how much they personally intended to contribute toward reaching this collective goal.

The experiment involved four treatments (certainty, uncertainty, warning wide, warning narrow), each comprising 10 groups. The certainty and uncertainty treatments are identical to the certainty and risk (i.e., uncertainty) treatments from the study by Dannenberg et al (2015). The threshold was certain in the certainty treatment, whereas it was uncertain in the uncertainty, warning-wide, and warning-narrow treatments. In the certainty treatment, groups were told the threshold was $120, whereas in the other treatments, they were informed it was a random amount between $0 and $240, with each whole dollar amount having an equal probability of being selected, but the exact amount would not be determined and announced until the conclusion of the game. The warning-wide and warning-narrow treatments differed from the uncertainty treatment in that in round 6—before the second set of non-binding proposals and pledges—unexpectedly, groups received an early warning signal that the uncertainty surrounding the threshold had been reduced. Specifically, in the warning-wide treatment, groups were instructed the threshold was now a random amount between $84 and $156 (reducing uncertainty to within 30% of the threshold value), whereas in the warning-narrow treatment, they were instructed the threshold was now a random amount between $108 and $132

(reducing uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value). Thus, the uncertainty treatments (uncertainty, warning wide, warning narrow) were all based on a uniform distribution with an expected threshold value of $120.

The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: we begin by reporting the detailed methods of our experiment, followed by the predictions and game equilibria. We then present the experimental results before discussing their relationship to the background literature and their implications for the climate negotiations.

Methods

Ethical approval to conduct the experiment was granted by the Human Ethics office at the University of Western Australia (UWA) (RA/4/1/6996: Committing to the public good).

Participants

Two hundred and forty members of the campus community at the University of Western Australia (UWA) participated in the experiment (mean age = 24.37 years; SD = 7.30; range = 17–56; 146 females and 93 males, 1 gender unspecified). Participants were recruited using the Online Recruitment System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2015), an open-source web-based recruitment platform used by the Behavioural Economics Laboratory at UWA. The ORSEE database contains a pool of over 1,500 UWA staff and students from a range of academic disciplines. Participants were recruited by issuing electronic invitations to randomly selected individuals in the ORSEE database to attend the experimental sessions.

Design

The experiment employed a 4 (treatment: certainty vs. uncertainty vs. warning wide vs. warning narrow) × 10 (round: 1–10) mixed design: treatment was a between-groups factor, whereas round was a within-groups factor. Participants were tested in groups of six players (ten groups per treatment). We commenced testing with the uncertainty treatments (uncertainty, warning wide, warning narrow)—randomly allocating each six-person group to one of the three treatments—before collecting the data for the certainty treatment. Despite the nonrandom allocation to the certainty treatment, there was no evidence that participants in this treatment differed significantly from those in the other treatments on the basis of age (Kruskal-Wallis, $\chi^2_{df=3} = 1.22$, $P = .748$), gender (Kruskal-Wallis, $\chi^2_{df=3} = 1.68$, $P = .642$), or responses on a post-game economic preferences questionnaire (see Supplementary Statistical Analyses). Table 1 provides a summary of the experimental design, which is elaborated below. The table also includes the cooperative and Nash equilibrium predictions of a game-theoretic model of our experiment that we will consider in a later section.

Table 1 Overview of the design of the experiment including the cooperative and Nash equilibrium predictions.

Treatment	Q Rounds 1–10		Expected value	N Participants	Cooperative equilibrium	Nash equilibrium
Certainty	\$120		\$120	$10 \times 6 = 60$	\$120 (1)	\$120 (1)
Uncertainty	[\$0, \$240]		$E(Q) = \$120$	$10 \times 6 = 60$	\$106.67 (0.44)	\$11.42 (0.05)
	Q Rounds 1–5	Q Rounds 6–10				
Warning Wide	[\$0, \$240]	[\$84, \$156]	$E(Q) = 120$	$10 \times 6 = 60$	\$156 (1)	\$99.42 (0.21)
Warning Narrow	[\$0, \$240]	[\$108, \$132]	$E(Q) = 120$	$10 \times 6 = 60$	\$132 (1)	\$124.71 (0.7)

Q, threshold for catastrophe. Values in parentheses in columns six and seven represent the predicted probability of avoiding catastrophe.

Apparatus, materials, and procedure

Experimental sessions were conducted in the Behavioural Economics Laboratory, a computerised laboratory for running economic experiments at UWA, in the presence of two experimenters. At the start of a session, players were randomly seated at interconnected computer terminals running the Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (z-Tree) (Fischbacher, 2007), which was used to register and communicate their decisions during the experiment. The computer terminals were separated by privacy blinds to prevent player collusion. Participants read an information sheet and provided written informed consent initially, after which they read the experimental instructions and answered a series of control questions (see Supplementary Experimental Instructions) to ensure they understood the rules of play. The experiment did not commence until the experimenters had verified that all players had answered the control questions correctly. To ensure anonymity, each player was assigned a pseudonym before the game commenced (Ananke, Telesto, Despina, Japetus, Kallisto, or Metis). During the game, each player's decisions were communicated to the other players under their designated pseudonyms.

The structure of the game is depicted in Fig. 1. At the start of the game, each player was given a $40 endowment. In each of ten rounds, players decided simultaneously and independently whether to contribute $0, $2, or $4 of their endowment into an account for damage prevention. Players knew that the total amount invested in the damage prevention account by the end of the game must equal or exceed a threshold amount; otherwise, each player would lose 90% of their remaining endowment. In the certainty treatment, the instructions emphasised that the threshold amount to be reached by the end of the game was $120. By contrast, in the uncertainty treatments (uncertainty, warning wide, warning narrow), the instructions emphasised that the threshold amount was a random amount between $0 and $240, with each whole dollar amount having an equal probability of being selected, but the exact amount would not be determined and declared until the conclusion of the game.

At the start of rounds 1 and 6, each player simultaneously and independently submitted two non-binding announcements. First, each player submitted a proposal regarding how much the group should contribute in total over the ten rounds. After each player had registered their proposal, the proposals of all players, as well as the group average, were displayed on all computers simultaneously. Players knew that the average group proposal would serve as the agreed collective target. Second, each player submitted a pledge regarding how much money they would personally contribute in total over the ten rounds. Once each player had registered their pledge, the pledges of all players, as well as the group total, were displayed on all computers simultaneously along with the group proposals to facilitate comparison.

At the end of each round, the contribution decisions of all six players, their cumulative contributions across all rounds played so far, and their proposals and pledges were displayed on all computers simultaneously (in addition to the total current round contributions, total contributions across all rounds played



Fig. 1 An illustration of the structure of the catastrophe avoidance game. At the start of the game, \$40 is credited to the personal account of each player ($N = 6$). In the certainty treatment, players are instructed that the threshold is \$120, whereas, in the uncertainty, warning-wide, and warning-narrow treatments, players are told the threshold is a uniform random value between \$0–\$240, but they will not know the actual value of the threshold until the end of the game. In each of 10 rounds, R_{1-10}, each player must decide simultaneously and independently whether to contribute \$0, \$2, or \$4 from their personal account into a damage prevention account. At the start of round 1—and again in round 6—players simultaneously and independently submit two non-binding announcements before making their contribution decision. First, each player submits a 'proposal' regarding the target level of contributions the group should aim for by round 10, and the average of these proposals becomes the agreed collective target. Next, each player submits a 'pledge' regarding the total amount that they will personally contribute across the 10 rounds toward reaching the agreed collective target. In the warning-wide and warning-narrow treatments, before players submit their second set of non-binding proposals in round 6, they are instructed that the uncertainty about the threshold has reduced and that the threshold is now a uniform random value between \$84–\$156 (warning wide) or \$108–\$132 (warning narrow). At the end of the game, the contributions in the damage prevention account are compared with the known (certainty treatment) or randomly chosen (uncertainty, warning-wide, and warning-narrow treatments) threshold. In the uncertainty treatments, the computer determines the exact threshold amount by drawing a random number from a uniform distribution either over the interval [0, 240] (uncertainty treatment), [84, 156] (warning-wide treatment), or [108, 132] (warning-narrow treatment). If the total contributions equal or exceed the threshold, then the damage is avoided, and players get to keep the remaining contents of their personal accounts; otherwise, they lose 90% of their remaining funds.

so far, average group proposal, and total group pledges). In this way, as the game progressed, players were able to gauge whether their group members were adhering to their pledges and whether the group contributions were consistent with achieving the agreed (average) group proposal.

At the start of round 6, before the second set of non-binding announcements, groups in the warning-wide and warning-narrow treatments were given an on-screen warning informing them that the uncertainty surrounding the location of the threshold had now been reduced. Specifically, in the warning-wide treatment, groups were informed that the threshold amount was now a random amount between \$84–\$156 (equivalent to a 70% reduction in threshold

uncertainty), whereas, in the warning-narrow treatment, groups were informed that the threshold amount was now a random amount between \$108–\$132 (equivalent to a 90% reduction in threshold uncertainty). In the certainty and uncertainty treatments, the known threshold (\$120) and uncertain threshold range (\$0–\$240), respectively, remained the same as specified at the outset, and groups in these treatments did not, therefore, receive any additional information about the threshold. Instead, at the start of round 6, groups in these treatments proceeded directly to submit their second set of non-binding announcements.

At the end of the game, the threshold amount and the contents of the damage prevention account were communicated to the group. In the uncertainty treatments, the computer determined the exact threshold amount by drawing a random number from a uniform distribution either over the interval [0, 240] (uncertainty treatment), [84, 156] (warning-wide treatment), or [108, 132] (warning-narrow treatment). Once this information had been communicated to the group, participants completed a brief economic preferences questionnaire comprising single-item self-reported measures of risk aversion, loss aversion, trust, fairness, altruism, and temporal discounting (see Supplementary Statistical Analyses). Participants were then paid in cash either the full remainder of their endowment (if the group contributions reached or exceeded the threshold amount) or 10% of the balance of their endowment (if the group failed to reach the threshold amount), in addition to a \$10 attendance fee. The average payout was \$20.15 (inclusive of attendance fee). The cash was concealed in envelopes to protect the anonymity of players.

Predictions and equilibria

Consistent with earlier studies (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Barrett, 2014; Brown and Kroll, 2017; Dannenberg et al, 2015), we predicted that threshold uncertainty would undermine cooperation, such that group contributions and the probability of avoiding catastrophe would be reliably lower in the uncertainty treatment than in the certainty treatment. Based on the results of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a), we further predicted that an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 30% of the threshold value would fail to catalyse cooperation, such that group contributions and the probability of avoiding catastrophe would not differ between the uncertainty and warning-wide treatments, whereas an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value would catalyse cooperation, such that group contributions and the probability of avoiding catastrophe would be higher in the warning-narrow than the uncertainty treatment.

In addition to these empirically-guided predictions, we also formulated a game-theoretic model of our experiment (see Supplementary Analysis of Experimental Model). The imperfect information and repeated and multiple-player structure of the experiment allow for multiple Nash equilibria, and this complexity precludes a full equilibrium analysis. We therefore analyse the game

under a set of simplifying assumptions, one of which is that all players are risk-neutral, and focus on two solutions—the internal cooperative equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. This is possible because the game has a single pay-off period at the end of the game and can therefore be partially analysed as an equivalent one-shot game. Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) provide a similar analysis of such a game. Table 1 presents the cooperative and Nash equilibrium contribution levels predicted by our experimental model, which we review next.

The cooperative equilibrium is the best joint outcome for all group members. In the certainty treatment, this outcome arises when group members collectively contribute $120, and catastrophe is avoided with certainty. For the uncertainty treatment, this outcome arises when group members collectively contribute $106.67, which is less than the expected value of the threshold ($120) and the upper limit of the threshold range ($240). These equilibria are an accurate guide to behaviour—our certainty and uncertainty treatments are equivalent to those used in the study by Dannenberg et al (2015) in which aggregate group contributions were €121.2 and €101.4, respectively. For the warning-wide and warning-narrow treatments, the cooperative equilibrium arises when group members collectively contribute an amount equal to the upper limit of the threshold range; that is, $156 and $132, respectively. Although collective payoffs are maximised at these equilibria, the empirical studies reviewed suggest it is unlikely that group contributions will reach the upper bound in these treatments, especially in the warning-wide treatment.

The predictions based on cooperative equilibrium contribution levels are that catastrophe should be avoided with certainty in the certainty, warning-wide, and warning-narrow treatments, whereas catastrophe should occur more often than not in the uncertainty treatment. These predictions are at variance with our empirically-guided predictions.

The cooperative equilibrium does not take into account a player's choice of strategy based on their beliefs about the actions of others. For this reason, a better guide to actual behaviour is likely to be provided by the Nash equilibrium, which refers to a set of player strategies in which each player has chosen their best response to the strategies they think their co-players will adopt.

For the certainty treatment, the Nash equilibrium contribution level is $120 (contributing $0 is also a Nash equilibrium, albeit with a much lower payoff, making $120 the "focal" contribution level; Schelling, 1960), which is the same as the cooperative equilibrium. For the uncertainty treatment, the Nash equilibrium contribution level is $11.42, which is considerably lower than the cooperative equilibrium and what we would expect based on actual behaviour (Dannenberg et al, 2015). For the warning-wide and warning-narrow treatments, the Nash equilibrium contribution levels are $99.42 and $124.71, respectively, which are less than the cooperative equilibrium contribution levels—much less in the case of the warning-wide treatment.

These predictions based on Nash equilibrium contribution levels are qualitatively consistent with our empirically guided predictions—catastrophe

should be avoided with certainty in the certainty treatment and avoided more often than not in the warning-narrow treatment, whereas, in the uncertainty and warning-wide treatments, catastrophe should occur more often than not.

Results

The results are structured into four sections that examine the impact of the four experimental treatments on: (1) total contributions (2) contributions over rounds, (3) the probability of avoiding catastrophe, and (4) the link between proposals, pledges, and contributions. For all analyses, the basic statistical unit is the group.

Total contributions

We begin by considering total group contributions across the four treatments and their relation to the cooperative and Nash equilibrium contribution levels (Table 1). Average group contributions collapsed over rounds (M ± SD) are markedly higher in the certainty (\$119 ± 19.53) than the uncertainty treatment (\$101.4 ± 22.21). Contributions in the certainty treatment are, on average, close to the cooperative and Nash equilibrium contribution level (Wilcoxon = 36.00, $P = .122$), whereas contributions in the uncertainty treatment are close to the cooperative equilibrium contribution level (Wilcoxon = 21.00, $P = .557$) but significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium contribution level (Wilcoxon = 55.00, $P = .002$).[1] Average group contributions are marginally higher in the warning-wide (\$109.4 ± 23.8) than the uncertainty treatment, whereas average group contributions are markedly higher in the warning-narrow (\$124.2 ± 11.33) than the uncertainty treatment. Contributions in the warning-wide treatment are, on average, significantly lower than the cooperative equilibrium contribution level (Wilcoxon = 0.00, $P = .002$) but close to the Nash equilibrium contribution level (Wilcoxon = 41.00, $P = .193$). Contributions in the warning-narrow treatment are lower than the cooperative equilibrium contribution level, albeit not quite significantly so (Wilcoxon = 8.50, $P = .059$), but virtually identical to the Nash equilibrium contribution level (Wilcoxon = 26.00, $P = .922$). Thus, on the whole, average group contributions are most consistent with the predictions based on Nash equilibrium contribution levels.

Contributions over rounds

Next, we examine the pattern of contributions over the first and second halves of the game. Fig. 2a shows the ex-ante (rounds 1–5) and ex-post (rounds 6–10) early warning signal group contributions by treatment. Ex-ante contributions do not differ significantly by treatment (Kruskal-Wallis, $\chi^2_{df=3} = 0.72$, $P = .869$), whereas ex-post contributions do (Kruskal-Wallis, $\chi^2_{df=3} = 10.95$, $P =$

[1] We note that the accuracy of the Nash equilibrium contribution prediction for the uncertainty treatment could probably be improved by rerunning the analysis for an "average" level of risk aversion. Most players will want a lower level of risk than the "representative" risk-neutral player in our simplified experimental model.



Fig. 2 Contributions in the catastrophe avoidance game as a function of the four treatments. **a,** Average group contributions in the first (rounds 1–5) and second (rounds 6–10) halves of the game (error bars represent standard errors). **b,** Average group contributions as a function of each individual round of the game.

.012). Ex-post contributions are significantly lower in the uncertainty than the certainty treatment (Mann-Whitney = 80.00, $P = .025$), confirming that threshold uncertainty reduced group contributions. Critically, whereas ex-post contributions do not differ significantly between the warning-wide and uncertainty treatments (Mann-Whitney = 33.500, $P = .224$), ex-post contributions are significantly higher in the warning-narrow than the uncertainty treatment (Mann-Whitney = 9.00, $P = .002$).

To scrutinise the data further, Fig. 2b plots the dynamics of group contributions over rounds for the four treatments. It can be seen that, with the exception of a trough in contributions in round 7, group contributions do not

differ significantly over rounds in the certainty treatment (Freidman, $\chi^2_{df=9} = 7.89$, $P = .545$), whereas group contributions decrease over rounds in the uncertainty treatment (Freidman, $\chi^2_{df=9} = 23.89$, $P = .004$), with this decrease becoming more pronounced in the latter half of the game after the second set of proposals and pledges. Unlike the uncertainty treatment, group contributions in the warning-wide treatment did not tail off significantly over rounds (Freidman, $\chi^2_{df=9} = 5.90$, $P = .750$), indicating that the early warning signal mid-game helped to stabilise group contributions. The pattern of group contributions in the warning-narrow treatment is uniquely different from the remaining treatments. Although group contributions decrease initially in the first half of the game, there is a punctuated peak in contributions in round 6 following the arrival of the early warning signal, after which contributions decay gradually, with a slight upturn in the final round (Freidman, $\chi^2_{df=9} = 15.61$, $P = .076$).

In brief, whilst an early warning signal reducing uncertainty to within 30% of the threshold value did nothing to stimulate contributions, an early warning signal reducing uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value increased contributions to a level comparable to that observed in the certainty treatment.

Probability of avoiding catastrophe

We now examine the probability of avoiding catastrophe according to experimental treatment. The percentage of groups that would have averted catastrophe at various hypothetical thresholds is shown in Fig. 3a. At threshold values of \$40, \$60, and \$80, most groups would have averted catastrophe, irrespective of treatment. At a threshold value of \$100, 90% of groups in the certainty treatment, 70% of groups in the uncertainty and warning-wide treatments, and 100% of groups in the warning-narrow treatment would have averted catastrophe.

Special attention must be given to the threshold value of \$120 because it is the actual threshold value in the certainty treatment and the expected threshold value in the uncertainty treatments (uncertainty, warning wide, warning narrow). Thus, if we were to repeat the experiment many times, the average value of the threshold would be the expected value. Using the \$120 threshold value, 90% of groups in the certainty treatment and 30% of groups in the uncertainty treatment would have averted catastrophe, a significant difference between treatments (Fisher exact, $P = 0.020$), confirming that threshold uncertainty reliably reduced the probability of group success. In the warning-wide treatment, 40% of groups would have averted catastrophe, which is not significantly higher than in the uncertainty treatment (Fisher exact, $P = 1.000$), indicating that an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 30% of the threshold value did not increase the probability of group success. However, in the warning-narrow treatment, 70% of groups would have averted catastrophe, more than doubling the probability of group success compared to the uncertainty treatment, although this comparison did not reach



Fig. 3 Probability of avoiding catastrophe as a function of the four treatments. **a,** Percentage of groups avoiding catastrophe for various hypothetical threshold values. **b,** Probability of avoiding catastrophe per group (denoted by the dots) and average catastrophe avoidance probability by treatment (denoted by the bars) after taking stochastic uncertainty into account.

statistical significance (Fisher exact, $P = 0.179$). It is likely that a higher number of observations would have revealed a significant difference between the two treatments.

Fig. 3a shows group success rates at three additional hypothetical thresholds, namely $132, $156, and $240. These correspond to the upper threshold limits that groups must have reached in the warning-narrow, warning-wide, and uncertainty treatments, respectively, to avert catastrophe with certainty. At $132, only 20% of groups in the uncertainty treatment, 30% of groups in

the warning-wide treatment, and 20% of groups in the warning-narrow treatment would have averted catastrophe. That more groups in the warning-narrow treatment did not reach the \$132 threshold is noteworthy, given that a fair-share contribution of \$22 per player would have ensured that catastrophe was averted with certainty. Unsurprisingly, at \$156 and \$240, none of the groups would have averted catastrophe.

A strength of the just presented analysis is that it compares the different treatments on a level playing field using a constant threshold for group success. However, a limitation is that, given a fixed contribution level, it does not factor into account variability in the odds of success across treatments based on the degree of uncertainty about the threshold (e.g., contributing \$120 in the certainty treatment prevents catastrophe occurring with certainty, whereas in the uncertainty, warning-wide, and warning-narrow treatments it still leaves a 50% chance of catastrophe occurring). Accordingly, we conducted a further analysis that took this stochastic uncertainty into account. Specifically, for each group, the probability, p, of avoiding catastrophe was determined by:

$$p = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } Q_T < Q_{min} \\ (Q_T – Q_{min})/(Q_{max} – Q_{min}) & \text{for } Q_T \in [Q_{min}, Q_{max}] \\ 1 & \text{if } Q_T > Q_{max} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where Q_T is the total contribution, summed across the contributions of all six group members over all ten rounds, and Q_{min} and Q_{max} are the lower and upper threshold limits, respectively, of the treatment to which the group belongs (for the warning-wide and warning-narrow treatments these are the narrowed limits introduced mid-game).

The results are plotted in Fig. 3b from which it can be seen that the probability of avoiding catastrophe differed appreciably across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis, $\chi^2_{df=3} = 14.97$, $P = .002$). The probability was significantly higher in the certainty (90%) than the uncertainty treatment (42%) (Mann-Whitney = 90.00, $P = .002$), confirming that threshold uncertainty reduced the probability of group success. The probability of avoiding catastrophe was slightly lower in the warning-wide (38%) than the uncertainty treatment, but not significantly so (Mann-Whitney = 44.00, $P = .677$), confirming that an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 30% of the threshold value did not improve the odds of group success. Finally, the probability of avoiding catastrophe was higher in the warning-narrow (61%) than the uncertainty treatment—equivalent to a 45% increase in the probability of avoiding catastrophe—confirming that an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value increased the probability of group success. However, the comparison only approached but did not reach statistical significance (Mann-Whitney = 69.00, $P = .162$). Once again, it is likely that the



Fig. 4 Average group proposals, pledges, and contributions as a function of the four treatments.

comparison would have attained statistical significance with a larger number of groups.[2]

Proposals, pledges, and contributions

Finally, we compared group proposals, pledges, and contributions across treatments. Since group proposals and pledges in round 1 did not differ appreciably from those in round 6 (see Supplementary Statistical Analyses), for simplicity, we combined each into a single measure by averaging group proposals and pledges in the two rounds. The results are shown in Fig. 4, where the treatments have been organised, from left to right, in order of increasing threshold uncertainty (certainty < warning narrow < warning wide < uncertainty) instead of ascending treatment order. It can be seen that as threshold uncertainty increases, so too does the gap between what groups propose to do, pledge to do, and actually contribute. In the certainty and warning-narrow treatments, group proposals, pledges, and contributions fall closely in line. Indeed, in the warning-narrow treatment, contributions are numerically higher than proposals and pledges. By contrast, in the warning-wide and uncertainty treatments, pledges are less than proposals, and contributions, in turn, are less than pledges.

[2]We note that the analyses of the probability of avoiding catastrophe are less sensitive than the analyses of group contributions, and a power analysis suggests that we are statistically somewhat underpowered to detect what is a modest-sized effect (i.e., the uncertainty vs. warning-narrow comparison). Nevertheless, our sample size of 10 groups per treatment is consistent with sample-size norms for research in this field (Hurlstone et al, 2017). Accordingly, our power to detect a reliable difference is no less than other studies in the literature. In presenting formal analyses of these data, we have gone beyond convention in the field—most authors only report these data visually but do not subject them to statistical analysis (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012, 2014a; Dannenberg et al, 2015), instead limiting inferential statistics to comparisons based on contribution levels.

Discussion

Under conditions more reflective of the real game of climate change, the current study sought to replicate and extend the finding of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) that an early warning signal reducing threshold uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value facilitates cooperation, whereas an early warning signal reducing threshold uncertainty by less than this amount has no effect on behaviour. To that end, we employed an iterated, rather than one-shot, catastrophe avoidance game in which threshold uncertainty was initially large in two treatments but subsequently reduced mid-game to within either 30% or 10% of the threshold value. We contrasted the behaviour of groups in these early warning treatments with that of groups in a certainty treatment, where the threshold was known with certainty, and an uncertainty treatment, where groups faced the same degree of threshold uncertainty throughout the game as that confronting groups initially in the early warning treatments.

Overview of key findings

Consistent with earlier threshold studies, using both one-shot (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012, 2014a) and iterated (Dannenberg et al, 2015; Brown and Kroll, 2017) games, we find that threshold uncertainty is a serious impediment to collective action. Compared to a certainty situation, threshold uncertainty reduced group contributions and increased the probability of catastrophe occurring. However, and critically, in line with Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a), an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value catalysed cooperation, increasing total group contributions to a level comparable to that witnessed under a certainty situation and reducing (albeit not quite reliably so) the probability of catastrophe occurring, compared to an uncertainty situation without a forewarning. By contrast, an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 30% of the threshold value did little to stimulate group contributions. These results were obtained despite the shift from a one-shot to an iterated game, the use of dynamic rather than static thresholds in the early warning treatments, and the fact that groups did not receive foreknowledge that the threshold uncertainty range would change mid-game. This confirms that the key results of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) are robust and not the consequence of specific features of their study methodology.

However, our results and those of Dannenberg et al (2015) suggest that the effect of threshold uncertainty, whilst robust, is not as strong in an iterated game as in a one-shot game. Using equation 1 to compute catastrophe avoidance probabilities, in Barrett and Dannenberg (2012, 2014a) the probability of avoiding catastrophe is 85% in the certainty treatment and $\approx$ 0% in the 100–200 treatment, where threshold uncertainty is at its widest. In our study, the probability of avoiding catastrophe is 90% in the certainty treatment and 42% in the uncertainty treatment. The corresponding values for Dannenberg et al

(2015) are comparable: 100% vs. ≈ 42%, respectively. This result is noteworthy given that in our study, and that of Dannenberg et al (2015), the threshold uncertainty range is larger than in Barrett and Dannenberg (2012, 2014a), which might lead one to expect that the impact of threshold uncertainty would be larger, not smaller.

Although the handicap of threshold uncertainty is not as pronounced in our study as in Barrett and Dannenberg (2012, 2014a), somewhat counterintuitively, so too is the impact of an early warning signal on cooperation. In our study, an early warning signal that reduced uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value increased the probability of avoiding catastrophe from 42% to 61%, compared to 90% in the certainty treatment. By contrast, in Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a), it increased the probability of avoiding catastrophe from 0% to 75%, compared to 85% in the certainty treatment. However, the threshold uncertainty range in our warning-narrow treatment was wider than in the 145–155 treatment of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a), which may explain why our early warning signal was less effective at catalysing cooperation—in absolute terms, the reduction in threshold uncertainty was greater in their study than in ours. Moreover, in our study, the reduction in uncertainty occurs as a surprise mid-game rather than being known throughout their one-shot game, which may render it harder to avoid the threshold.

These nuanced differences between studies should be interpreted with some caution, as the studies differ along dimensions other than those discussed above. Indeed, what is most impressive is the remarkable degree of correspondence between our results and those of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a), notwithstanding their methodological differences. Our findings agree with theirs in demonstrating that threshold uncertainty is a handicap to cooperation and that for an early warning signal to spur cooperation, it must reduce uncertainty to within at least 10% of the threshold value—anything short of this is likely to be ineffective.

Implications for climate negotiations

If a red line for dangerous climate change could be identified, fear of crossing it would spur collective action to avoid it. The science of early warning signals offers the tantalising prospect that uncertainty about the location of a climate tipping point may be reduced as we get closer to it. However, our results and those of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) are clear in demonstrating that for such an early warning signal to be effective, it must reduce uncertainty to within at least 10% of the location of the threshold. It is worrying, therefore, that there are question marks regarding whether an early warning signal could provide the level of precision necessary in these studies to transform the collective action problem (Lenton, 2014).

Even if such a level of precision is possible, our results suggest that an early warning signal offers no assurance that the threshold will be avoided. A worrying aspect of our findings is that groups do not adhere to the precautionary principle of risk management (Gardiner, 2006). In our warning-narrow

treatment, groups must contribute an amount equal to or greater than \$132, the upper threshold limit, to avert catastrophe with certainty. Group contributions in this treatment, on average, were just above the expected threshold value of \$120, which requires a fair-share contribution of \$20 per group member. Increasing this contribution by a mere \$2 per group member would be sufficient to avoid catastrophe with certainty. Yet, only 20% of groups in this treatment did so. Indeed, our groups were contented to contribute \$120, as reflected in their aggregate proposals, despite the fact this still leaves a 50% chance of catastrophe occurring. In terms of actual group contributions, rather than proposals, there remains a residual 39% chance of catastrophe occurring in this treatment.

There are other limitations of early warning signals. The best way to reduce uncertainty about a threshold is to get closer to it, but by then, it may already be too late to take emergency measures to avoid crossing it. There is also the risk that an early warning signal may go undetected, meaning we may not know about the location of the threshold until it has already been breached. Continued investment in the identification and detection of early warning signals is evidently warranted, as our results attest, and even if they arrive too late to mobilise collective action to avoid climate tipping points, they may nevertheless serve as an aid to pre-emptive adaptation (Lenton, 2011). It is clear, though, that early warning signals do not constitute a silver bullet, and climate negotiators will therefore need to entertain other strategies to cultivate the cooperation needed to avoid a climate catastrophe.

As noted by Barrett and Dannenberg (2014b), the problem with the contemporary climate agreements is that it is Mother Nature, rather than the countries themselves, that provides the enforcement. That is, it is Mother Nature's threat to tip the climate system into chaos if a climate tipping point is breached that provides the incentive for collective action. However, threshold uncertainty undermines the credibility of this threat. Since uncertainty about climate thresholds is difficult to reduce, enforcement is out of the control of the countries—it is Mother Nature that holds all the cards. As Barrett and Dannenberg (2014b) note, if Mother Nature cannot provide the enforcement, then countries must do so themselves.

One way to think about this challenge is in terms of the game-theoretic model of threshold uncertainty developed by Barrett (2013). According to this model, there exists a theoretical dividing line in threshold uncertainty. To the right of this dividing line, when threshold uncertainty is large, the climate cooperation problem is a prisoners' dilemma, whereas to the left of the dividing line, when threshold uncertainty is small, the climate cooperation problem is a coordination game. Cooperation is difficult to achieve in the prisoners' dilemma because there is only one Nash equilibrium, and it is a non-cooperative equilibrium in which all countries defect. By contrast, cooperation is easier to achieve in the coordination game because there are two Nash equilibria, a dangerous equilibrium in which all countries defect and a safe equilibrium in which all countries cooperate. The safe equilibrium is "focal"

(Schelling, 1960) or psychologically prominent since no country wants to suffer catastrophe. Cooperation, thus, simply requires that countries coordinate on the mutually preferred safe equilibrium.

Viewed through this lens, the challenge for climate negotiators is to devise strategic enforcement mechanisms that allow countries to escape the prisoners' dilemma by converting it into a coordination game. An example of the use of strategic enforcement is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, one of the most effective international environmental agreements ever negotiated. The success of this agreement lies in its strategic use of the threat to restrict trade in controlled substances between parties and non-parties (Barrett, 2003, 2007), which converts the ozone depletion prisoners' dilemma into a coordination game (Barrett, 2016). One way to achieve this same transformation to tackle the climate problem is by linking trade agreements with climate protection and using the strategic threat to impose tariffs on countries that do not take appropriate measures to reduce their emissions to enforce climate cooperation (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2022).

Potential limitations and future directions

There are some potential limitations of our study that merit comment. First, the initial threshold uncertainty in the uncertainty treatments (\$0–\$240)—which ranged from group members not needing to contribute anything to their entire endowment to avert catastrophe—is much larger than the threshold uncertainty (1.5–2°C) in the real game of climate change. An early warning signal that reduces uncertainty to within 10% of the threshold value might be more effective at catalysing cooperation when the initial threshold uncertainty is smaller, as it must surely be in the real climate game. Thus, our study may have underestimated the potential effectiveness of early warning signals. However, it is non-trivial to translate the threshold uncertainty in the real climate game into proportional uncertainty, as represented in our experiment.

Second, the early warning signals in our study arrived unexpectedly. Arguably, it would have been more reflective of the real game of climate change to have forewarned groups at the outset regarding the prospect of a change in the degree of uncertainty about the threshold mid-game. This is because ever since the climate negotiations in Cancun (UNFCCC, 2010), countries have been alert to the possibility that they may need to limit warming to 1.5°C, rather than 2°C. Indeed, a special report by the IPCC (Allen et al, 2019) highlighted the pressing need to restrict warming to 1.5°C—this call to action serving as an early warning of the need for more stringent climate action. Foreknowledge of the prospect of an early warning signal could enhance the effectiveness of such signals, but it could also undermine them by, for example, promoting undue optimism or wishful thinking (Kruglanski et al, 2020; Sharot, 2011). Only further experiments comparing the impact of early warning signals with and without foreknowledge of their possible arrival will answer this question.

Third, we only examined the consequences for cooperation of early warning signals in which the expected value of the threshold remained the same, but the uncertainty around it was reduced. However, an early warning signal could also signify a shift in the expected value of the threshold, indicating that it is closer than originally anticipated, thus requiring emergency action to avoid it. Such a shift might be expected to cause groups to choke under pressure; alternatively, it might provide the sense of urgency required to catalyse groups into action. Once again, only further experiments can elucidate which of these possibilities is most likely.

Conclusions

Uncertainty about the threshold for dangerous climate change renders it difficult to mobilise collective action to avoid it. Our research and that of Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) demonstrates that early warning signals of an approaching tipping point can catalyse cooperation to prevent it from being exceeded, but only when such signals reduce uncertainty to within a very narrow range. Even then, our research implies that we cannot be assured countries will adhere to the precautionary principle and do what it takes to avoid the threshold with certainty. There remain important gaps in our knowledge of early warning signals that must be filled, such as how the prospects of cooperation are affected by early warning signals that indicate a shift in the expected value of the threshold, not merely a narrowing of the threshold range. However, the limitations of this approach mean climate negotiators must consider alternative strategies to motivate collective action other than the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold. Rather than leaving enforcement in the hands of Mother Nature, a better approach may be for climate negotiators to wrestle back control over the enforcement problem by using strategic treaty design to transform the climate change prisoners' dilemma into a coordination game, thus recreating the conditions that exist when the threshold is certain.

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The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

Author contributions

MJH and BRN conceived and designed the experiment; MJH programmed the experiment, collected the data, analysed the results, and wrote the paper;

BW performed the game-theoretic analysis; all authors reviewed and edited the paper.

Data availability

All raw data associated with this study, along with the computer programs used to execute the experimental treatments, have been deposited in a publicly accessible GitHub repository at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Threshold-Uncertainty-8BD0/.

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